Russian Losses
As of Oct 22, 2026, Ukraine’s General Staff reports 1,572,790 Russian personnel losses (killed and wounded), +2,250 in the past day. Estimated cumulative cost to Russia, with each dollar counted once: $1.91T.
Battlefield losses — Ukrainian General Staff
Cumulative since 24 Feb 2022 with the change over the past day. These are Ukrainian claims; independent verification is limited.
Personnel losses per month, 2026
The current month is month-to-date (lighter bar). Each day is counted under the date of the General Staff’s morning report.
Daily personnel losses, latest reports
From each morning’s General Staff report.
All General Staff categories
Full daily report. The total adds up the Value $US column. Dollar values are count × assumed replacement value per unit (full value, before the pre-war share used in the cost ledger). Value ₽ converts at the latest Bank of Russia official rate. Personnel has no equipment value.
| Category | Total | Past day | Value $US | Value ₽ |
|---|
Losses by category
Monthly losses reported by Ukraine’s General Staff since February 2022, for every category. Choose one below.
Personnel
Bars: losses per month (left scale). Line: running total (right scale). Yellow cap: record month. The current month is partial (lighter bar).
Tank reserves
Russia has replaced battlefield losses by pulling Soviet-era tanks out of storage; satellite counts show the reserve running out.
Tanks in Soviet-era storage
Satellite counts of nine storage bases (OSINT analyst Jompy).
How the numbers fit: Ukraine’s General Staff reports more than 12,000 Russian tanks destroyed, while photo-verified losses (Oryx) are about 4,400. Ukraine’s figure counts tanks hit, including some later repaired and hit again, and some misidentified vehicles; Oryx counts only losses caught on camera. Before the war Russia had about 3,000 active tanks; since then it has pulled about 5,250 from storage and built roughly 1,000–1,500 new ones, about 9,000–10,000 in all. Satellites see only outdoor storage, so other estimates of the pre-war reserve run from about 10,000 (IISS) to 12,000–20,000. This chart uses one analyst’s counts throughout, so its before and after figures are directly comparable.
Irreplaceable aircraft
Some losses cannot be made good at any price: Russia no longer builds these aircraft.
Recruitment
Russia replaces its losses mostly with paid volunteers. Pay and bonuses keep rising while sign-ups fall.
Death payments being cut
Regional payments to families of soldiers killed in the war, paid on top of the federal death payment. At least eight regions cut them in 2026, while many raised what they pay new recruits.
| Region | When | Before | Now | Cut | Notes |
|---|
Financial drain — estimated cost to Russia (USD)
Every row measures a separate slice of money: spending above the pre-war level, pre-war equipment destroyed, extra interest, physical assets destroyed, and lost economic output. Measures that sit inside another row are listed further down but not added.
rubles at the latest Bank of Russia rate
Estimated cost by category
Largest first. US dollars, then rubles at the latest Bank of Russia official rate.
Cost ledger — method and sources
Battlefield rows recalculate whenever the General Staff numbers are refreshed. Other rows are point-in-time estimates.
| Financial drain category | Estimate $US | Estimate ₽ | Low | High | Confidence | How it’s estimated, and source |
|---|
Measures not added — already inside another row
Kept for reference. Adding these would count the same money twice.
| Measure | Size | Why it isn’t added | Source |
|---|
Battlefield equipment value breakdown
Count × assumed unit value × pre-war share. The rest was built during the war and is inside the military budget row.
| Item | Count | Unit value | Full value | Pre-war share | Counted |
|---|
Major strikes monitor
Ukrainian strikes on targets in Russia and occupied Crimea since February 2022: refineries, air bases, ships, plants, depots and more. Bars show strikes per month.
| Date | Type | Target | Location | Detail | Source |
|---|
Refinery strikes
Ukraine’s long-range drones have hit most of Russia’s big oil refineries, many of them again and again, causing fuel shortages across the country.
Strikes by refinery
Major refineries and oil hubs, most-hit first. Capacity in million tonnes a year; distance from Ukrainian-held territory. Counts are documented strikes and may be incomplete (Wikipedia, The Refinery Ledger, news reports).
| Refinery | Region | Capacity (Mt/yr) | Distance (km) | Strikes | Latest | Notes |
|---|
All losses combined
Everything on this page added together, each dollar counted once. Battlefield equipment is included at its pre-war share; the rest of the equipment’s value is inside military spending.
Notes on method
Battlefield figures are the daily claims of Ukraine’s General Staff (personnel = killed and wounded). Russia does not publish comparable figures, and Western and independent estimates are generally lower.
To avoid double counting, military spending is counted only above its pre-war level, destroyed equipment only for the share that pre-dates the war, death payouts only from regional budgets, and lost output only once, as forgone GDP. Values with no public estimate (bases, data centres, unit values, pre-war shares) are our own estimates and are labelled as such.
Updated daily after the General Staff’s morning report (Kyiv time).
Federal debt rose from 20.9T rubles at the end of 2021 to 35.1T at the end of 2025, and interest is planned to take 8.8% of federal spending in 2026. The key rate stands at 14.0%.
Latest readings
Most recent official figure for each barometer, with its date.
Oil money
What the war economy earns from oil and gas, as Ukrainian strikes and sanctions bite.
Frozen reserves
Russian central bank reserves held in the West have been frozen since 2022. The profits they earn now help fund Ukraine.
Fiscal cliff gauge
How many months the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund (its cash and gold, Russia’s budget cushion) could cover the federal deficit on its own, with no new borrowing. Under six months is the danger zone; zero is the cliff.
Months of cover
Liquid fund ÷ monthly deficit. The dashed line is the straight-line trend of the last two readings, not a forecast.
Liquid National Wealth Fund
Trillions of rubles; the 2025 bump is an oil-revenue top-up.
Not a default countdown: Russia now funds most of its deficit by selling domestic bonds (OFZ), and still has central bank reserves outside the fund. Hitting zero would mean losing the cushion — leaving more borrowing at today’s high rates, tax rises, spending cuts or printing money.
Gold reserves
Gold is one of the few reserves sanctions can’t freeze, because it is stored in Russia. After two decades of buying, the central bank has sold gold every month since December 2025.
Central bank gold holdings
Tonnes; the 2026 decline is the first sustained selling in two decades.
Reserve fund (NWF) gold
Tonnes held by the National Wealth Fund.
History, 2019 to now
The dashed line marks the full-scale invasion. Lighter bars are 2026 plans or year-to-date readings, not full-year results.
Russian stock market — MOEX Russia Index, last 5 years
Month-end closes in rubles (October 2026 is the latest close). The index is now 41% below its 4,150 month-end peak.
Ruble vs US dollar — last 5 years
Rubles per US dollar, month-end (October 2026 is today’s Bank of Russia official rate of 81.97 ₽). Higher means a weaker ruble.
Military spending vs the rest of the federal budget
Trillions of rubles, nominal. 2026 is a projection (military: budget plus reported overrun; total: January–July pace).
GDP (USD)
Nominal rubles converted at the year’s average rate.
Real GDP growth
Percent change on the year before.
Key interest rate
Every Bank of Russia decision since 2020.
Inflation
December on December; 2026 is the latest reading.
Federal government debt
Trillions of rubles at year-end; 2026 is the government’s plan.
Debt to GDP
Federal debt as a share of GDP.
Federal budget balance
Surplus (+) or deficit (−) as a share of GDP.
Interest as a share of federal spending
Debt service ÷ total federal spending.
Oil and gas budget revenues
Trillions of rubles.
All fiscal barometers by year
Official Russian figures (Rosstat, Finance Ministry, Accounts Chamber, Bank of Russia). Some years have since been revised.
| Year | Status | GDP (T₽) | GDP ($B) | Real growth | Key rate (year-end) | Inflation (Dec) | Debt (T₽) | Debt/GDP | Budget balance | Interest (T₽) | Interest share | Military share | Military (T₽) | Other spending (T₽) | Oil & gas (T₽) | ₽ per $ (avg) |
|---|
Reading these numbers
These are Russia’s own official statistics. Since 2022 Russia has stopped publishing some data (detailed trade, parts of the budget), and outside economists debate how far GDP and inflation figures can be relied on. Debt to GDP stays low by international standards because Russia is largely shut out of foreign borrowing; the strain shows instead in the rising cost of interest, the shrinking liquid reserve fund and persistent deficits.
Bad loans are rising across Russia’s banking system: 11.8% of corporate loans and 13.1% of unsecured consumer loans are now problem loans, while personal bankruptcies and bond defaults are at records.
Latest readings
Most recent figure for each indicator, with its date.
Banks and credit quality
Problem loans by type
Share of each loan book classed as problem loans (Bank of Russia).
What borrowing costs, by loan type
Full cost of credit (interest plus fees), % a year, July 2026. Credit cards cost four times the key rate.
Banking sector profit
Trillions of rubles; 2022 collapsed under sanctions, 2025 fell on rising credit losses.
Housing and mortgages
Mortgage lending per year
Trillions of rubles issued; the 2023 peak came from subsidised loans that ended in July 2024.
Car loans per month
Thousands of new and used car loans (National Bureau of Credit Histories).
Defaults and bankruptcies
Personal bankruptcies per year
Thousands of people (Fedresurs); 2022–2024 rounded.
Corporate bond defaults
Missed bond payments, billions of rubles; 2026 is to early October.
Reading these numbers
Problem loans are the Bank of Russia’s own classification. Analysts at the government-linked CMASF think the real level is higher, because large borrowers often have loans restructured rather than declared bad. The Bank of Russia says banks have enough capital to absorb losses; critics describe a “latent” banking crisis. Bond default counts differ by source (Cbonds, Moscow Exchange, rating agencies), so treat them as close estimates.
13 of 14 large Russian companies trade below their end-2021 share price; the median stock is −34% in rubles and −40% in US dollars.
Share price change since the end of 2021
Last close of 2021 to the latest price, in rubles; the dollar figure applies the ruble’s move (74.3 → latest official rate). Price only — dividends are not included, so total returns for big dividend payers (Lukoil, Tatneft, Sberbank) are better than shown.
Top Russian companies
Prices adjusted for splits. End-2021 prices are approximate closes; market value is from the Moscow Exchange index factsheet (30 Jun 2026) where available.
| Ticker | Company | Sector | End 2021 ₽ | Latest ₽ | Change ₽ | Change $ | Market value | Notes |
|---|
MOEX Russia Index, last 5 years
The whole market for context; month-end closes in rubles.
Reading these numbers
Foreign investors have been locked out of Russian shares since 2022, so prices reflect domestic buyers only. Several companies issued many new shares (VTB, Aeroflot), which pushes the price per share down. Yandex and T-Bank were restructured into new companies, so their prices can’t be compared with 2021.
Bank shares: Europe, the US and Russia
December 2021 = 100. Europe: Euro Stoxx Banks (dividends reinvested, in euros). US: KBW Bank Index (price only, in dollars). Russia: RTS Financials (dividends reinvested, in dollars).
Bank shares since the invasion
2,326 international companies were still operating in Russia in mid-2025, and foreign firms paid at least $20B in Russian taxes in 2024. Below are the largest US and European companies among them.
Foreign business in Russia
KSE Institute figures as published in the B4Ukraine coalition’s August 2025 report (2024 data).
Russian profit tax paid in 2024, US and European companies
No to Russia
Countries closed to Russian tourists. Residents, close family and humanitarian cases are exempt. Since November 2025 the EU has also stopped almost all multiple-entry Schengen visas for Russians, yet France, Italy and Spain still issue most of the roughly 500,000 tourist visas Russians receive each year.
Passports
Russians now need the 10-year biometric passport to enter much of Europe, and it is the hardest one to get.
Biggest foreign companies still in Russia
Ranked by their latest revenue inside Russia, from the KSE Institute’s Leave Russia database. Includes Western and non-Western companies; figures in millions of US dollars.
| # | Company | Country | Industry | Revenue in Russia ($M) | Taxes in Russia ($M) | Staff | Notes |
|---|
See all 2,400+ companies still in Russia in the KSE Leave Russia database
The oligarchs
About a quarter of Russia’s billionaires left when the war began, but few cut ties. Those who stayed are richer than ever.
Who supplies Russia’s war
Countries that send weapons, people, parts or technology, or help Russia get around sanctions.
| Country | What it supplies | Scale | Notes |
|---|
Western brands, Russian copies
When Western companies left in 2022, their factories and restaurants mostly stayed open under new owners and new names.
Cars: the old Western plants
| Western brand | Now | Run by | What it makes | Notes |
|---|
Quality: Auto.ru test scores give the Tenet T8 4.2 out of 5, the Lada Iskra 3.7 and the Moskvich 6 3.6. In 2022 sanctions forced AvtoVAZ to build Lada Grantas without airbags or ABS, and in 2025 Rosstandart banned sales of some Chinese models over braking and noise.
Food: the old Western restaurants
| Western brand | Now | Run by | Size | Notes |
|---|
Company directory
Status is KSE Institute’s classification. “Staying” includes firms that say they supply essential goods under sanctions exemptions, and some that cannot get Russian government approval to sell.
About this list
The figures come from the KSE Institute’s Leave Russia database as published by B4Ukraine, a coalition campaigning for companies to exit, so the framing of the source is not neutral; the numbers themselves come from Russian company filings, with KSE estimates where firms stopped publishing. Exits since mid-2025 may not be reflected. Company logos are not shown because they are trademarked artwork.
Since the end of 2021, petrol has risen 58% and the minimum food basket 52%. Some shops now lock chocolate bars in alarmed cases, priced at up to 639 ₽ ($7.80 USD), and pawnshops are Russia’s fastest-growing business, with loans up 35% in a year.
Wages
What Russians earn: the yardstick for every price on this page.
The funeral economy
Verified deaths and what they mean for Russia’s funeral trade.
Average price of a coffin
Rubles; year-end points derived from Rosstat’s yearly growth rates.
Funeral services market
Billions of rubles per year; 2021 is approximate (lighter bar).
Food
What a basic grocery basket costs now compared with before the full-scale invasion.
Price of bread per kg
Rubles, Rosstat, December of each year; the last rye point is October 2026.
Minimum food basket by year
Rubles per person per month for 33 staples, December of each year; 2026 is August (lighter bar).
Fuel
Petrol prices, pushed up by the strikes on Russian refineries.
Pump prices today
Rosstat national averages; one US gallon is 3.785 litres; dollars at the latest Bank of Russia rate.
| Fuel | ₽ per litre | ₽ per US gallon | $ per litre | $ per US gallon | Dec 2021 ₽/litre | Change since 2021 |
|---|
Fuel prices per litre
Rubles, Rosstat national averages.
Shortages
What is running short: fuel, workers and soldiers.
Internet and messaging
Western messengers are blocked, mobile internet is switched off for hours or days, and a state messenger is pushed onto every phone.
Car parts and motor oil
Western carmakers stopped supplying Russia in 2022; parts now arrive through Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, China and others, and Russians keep older cars running instead of buying new ones.
New cars
Western brands left in 2022; Chinese cars and Chinese-based “Russian” brands took over.
Vodka
Russia sets a legal minimum shop price for vodka; it has risen every year since the invasion, along with excise tax.
Minimum price of a 0.5 litre bottle
Rubles, the legal minimum in force each year (Finance Ministry).
Electronics
Not everything got more expensive: iPhones now reach Russia through grey imports from third countries.
Imported goods
Everyday imports that cost far more than before the war, and new taxes that will push electronics up next.
Top 10 fastest-growing businesses
Where the money is growing in a stalling economy. Each row uses the best available measure for that business, so treat the order as indicative.
| # | Business | Growth | Measure | Period | Context |
|---|
Births
Births have fallen to levels not seen in about 200 years; Russia stopped publishing detailed birth data in 2025.
Births per year
Millions; 2025 is an independent estimate (lighter bar).
Life expectancy
Years at birth: Russia (Rosstat) against the European Union (Eurostat).
Life expectancy at birth, men and women
Years. Rosstat stopped publishing separate figures for men and women for 2024.
Air travel
Drone alerts close airports almost daily, while airlines fly seized Western jets they can no longer properly maintain.
Airport closures, counted daily
Counted automatically from Rosaviatsia’s own announcements of temporary restrictions. Red: full closures; yellow: flights only by special permission. Each airport in a group announcement counts once. The count began on 26 October 2026.
Grounded aircraft by airline
Aircraft grounded out of total fleet, summer 2026 (Kommersant). Fleet sizes for Pobeda and Nordwind from their published fleet lists; Nordwind’s count is estimated from its 44% share.
Reading these numbers
Funeral figures come from Rosstat and business registries as reported by The Moscow Times, Kommersant and others; in 2026 Rosstat stopped publishing the price of grave digging. The named-dead count is a floor: it includes only deaths confirmed in open sources. Food basket figures for Dec 2021 (Rosstat) and Aug 2026 (Rospodsoyuz, based on Rosstat prices) use the same 33-item set.
Missing something?
Are we missing key data or metrics you’d like us to track? Have data points you’d like to see added?